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— ABSTRACT —
The paper focuses on the assessment of how 
effective the Korean government’s actions taken 
to increase the fertility rate are� South Korea is 
a country with a very low fertility rate which is 
below the replacement level� This demographic 
situation causes the ageing of the Korean 
population� The paper shows the contemporary 
family policy, the analysis of sociodemographic 
indicators and the analysis based on the data 
from the Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women 
and Families in the two periods of time: in 2007 
and 2018, in order to show changes in the fertility 
intentions among the Korean women – in the 
sociological perspective� The statistical analysis 
indicates that the majority of the respondents 
had no intentions of having children� The results 
indicate that the Korean government’s actions 
are not sufficient to create an environment 
supporting the family in fertility intentions and 
— ABSTRAKT —
Artykuł koncentruje się na ocenie skuteczności 
działań rządu koreańskiego na rzecz zwiększenia 
dzietności� Korea Południowa to kraj o bardzo 
niskim współczynniku dzietności, który znajduje 
się poniżej poziomu zastępowalności pokoleń� Ta 
sytuacja demograficzna powoduje starzenie się 
społeczeństwa Korei� W celu wykazania zmian 
intencji dzietności wśród Koreanek w perspek-
tywie socjologicznej w artykule przedstawiono 
współczesną politykę rodzinną, analizę wskaźni-
ków socjodemograficznych oraz analizę opartą na 
danych z Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women 
and Families w dwóch okresach: 2007 i 2018� 
Analiza statystyczna wskazuje, że w większości 
respondenci nie mieli intencji posiadania 
dzieci� Wyniki wskazują, że działania rządu 
koreańskiego nie są wystarczające do stworzenia 
środowiska wspierającego rodzinę w intencjach 
i  zachowaniach związanych z  dzietnością, co 
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THE FERTILITY PROBLEM IN SOUTH KOREA –  
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
South Korea is a country which faces social problems such as low fertility (J� 
Yoon, 2006; Yoo & Sobotka, 2018; Jung et al�, 2019; S� Lim, 2021) and ageing 
population (D�H� Lim, Ryu, & Jang, 2020), which is typical of the emerging 
society 5�0 in that country as well as in Japan (cf� 5th Science and Technology 
Basic Plan, n�d�)� The analysis of the demographic data of over 60 years (O’Neill, 
2021) shows that South Korea has been undergoing dramatic demographic 
changes in the fertility rate, the number of population and the structure of the 
society� Till 1945, fertility in Korea was stable and was on the high level (6�0)� In 
the period from 1945 till 1950 a decrease was observed from 6�0 to 5�2, in the 
aftermath of the war� Then, it increased above 6�3 in the 1950s due to the devas-
tation and mass-displacement caused by the Korean War� As stability returned to 
the region, South Korea’s fertility rate fell sharply throughout the remainder of 
the century, as modernization, urbanization, and the implementation of family 
planning programs would see fertility fall to 2�6 in 1983 so from that time 
South Korea could be described as a low birth rate society� By 1990 fertility fell 
just over 1�5 children per woman (O’Neill, 2021)� Moreover, since 2001 South 
Korea has been an ultra-low birth rate society (TFR 1�31)� The first lowest point 
of fertility rate was in 2005 – 1�09, after that fertility slightly increased and in 
2016 the Total Fertility Rate was 1�17 (Statistics Korea, 2016), but this slight 
increase took only two years, because in 2018 South Korea experienced the 
lowest fertility rate ever – 0�92 (Statistics Korea, 2020)� Low fertility causes fast 
ageing of the Korean society (D�S� Kim, 2005; The World Bank, n�d�)� Today’s 
fertility rates strongly influence the size of the future labour force, for instance, 
with knock-on effects on future economic performance, tax revenue and the 
sustainability of the social protection systems� Ageing society is a huge social 
problem and a challenge for the Korean government to create a family policy 
that will contribute to the natural increase�
behaviour, which is reflected in the continued low 
fertility rate�
Keywords: family policy; fertility; family; women; 
South Korea
znajduje odzwierciedlenie w utrzymującym się 
na niskim poziomie współczynniku dzietności�
Słowa kluczowe: polityka rodzinna; dzietność; 
rodzina, kobiety; Korea Południowa
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METHODOLOGY
Due to the persistently low level of fertility in Korea, which is brought about by 
demographic, social and economic problems, the research problem is extremely 
important� It will allow assessing to what extent the creation of the family policy 
and actions taken by policymakers are effective, i�e�, they aim at increasing child 
births� The article presents analysis of sociodemographic and economic indica-
tors that directly or indirectly affect fertility and also comparative statistical 
analysis of fertility intentions of Korean women according to the data from the 
Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women and Families (KLoWF) from 2007 and 
2018, showing changes over time and current trends in fertility intentions�
The aim of the research is the assessment of how effective the contemporary 
family policy in South Korea is� The research question was: Is the contemporary 
policy effective enough, i�e�, does it affect the fertility rate?
The effectiveness of the actions taken is measured in two stages� On the one 
hand, the following elements will be analysed: fertility rate across time, number 
of children, percentage of mothers and fathers taking leave due to child delivery 
– this analysis forms stage 1 of the analysis in this article� On the other hand, the 
following elements will be analysed: number of children and fertility intentions 
of Korean women according to the data from the Korean Longitudinal Survey of 
Women and Families (KLoWF) from 2007 and 2018 – this analysis forms stage 2�
The presentation of the actions and law regulations taken by the govern-
ment under the family policy was the background of the analysis – cf� chapter: 
Contemporary family policy�
The study covered data from two surveys as to conduct a comparative analysis� 
KLoWF is a longitudinal survey conducted by the Korean Women’s Develop-
ment Institute (certificate number KNSO: 33801)� The multistage scheme for 
selecting the sample was used for the stratification of the sample of women 
that was representative for the country from among 9084 households from all 
urban and rural districts in Korea, except for the island of Jeju� The population 
covered by the survey consists of the total of 10,013 adult women aged 19–64 
(the percentage of responses: 95�8%), which took a survey every two years start-
ing from 2007 (the exception is a survey carried out in 2008)� The questionnaires 
were carried out by trained pollsters who conducted direct interviews via the 
Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI)� Further information on the 
project and methodology was published by the Korean Women’s Development 
Institute (Park et al�, 2008)�
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The second part of the analysis presents the aspects of the number of children 
and fertility intentions among the Korean women (respondents of KLoWF), 
which are dependent variables� The dependent variables were analysed in correla-
tion with the independent variable of the respondents’ age groups� The fertility 
intentions among the Korean women were compared in terms of changes over 
time between the first (2007) and the seventh wave (2018) of the surveys�
The statistical analysis adopted the categorisation of women in their repro-
ductive age – between 19 and 45, thereby the 19–49 age group adopted by the 
World Health Organization (2006) was not chosen due to very rare cases of 
women aged 46–49 willing to have children�
The statistical analysis of the research material collected as part of the Korean 
Longitudinal Survey of Women and Families was carried out with the aid of the 
statistical programme SPSS�
The statistical analysis used the independence test of X2 (chi-square) in order 
to test the relationship between the respondents’ age group, number of children 
and fertility intentions among the Korean women�
CONTEMPORARY FAMILY POLICY
The article focuses on the family policy, so it is necessary to define the term� 
Family policy has been a centre of interest among researchers around the world 
for many decades (Gauthier, 1996; Saraceno, 2011; Mätzke & Ostner, 2010; 
Hank & Steinbach, 2019)� The definition of family policy proposed by Adem 
(2012) and Bogenschneider (2014) describes family policy as a type of public 
and social policy aimed at promoting, protecting and strengthening families 
across five domains of family functioning: family creation, economic support, 
partnership support, childrearing, and caregiving� Examples of family policies 
include services and financial supports for child care, parental and family leave, 
child benefits and allowances, regulations related to marriage, cohabitation, 
and also domestic violence� Although a range of social and economic policies 
affect families, the proposed definition of family policy does not include indirect 
effects, such as healthcare, housing and employment policies�
Goals and instruments of family policies differ over time and across countries 
(Gauthier, 1996)� Governments of countries are trying to create a family policy 
that is adapted to the changing social, political and economic situation, as well 
as to the related social problems and phenomena�
93Katarzyna Juszczyk-Frelkiewicz : Contemporary Family Policy in South Korea 
For years, South Korea’s family policy has enjoyed interest in particular 
among Korean researchers, who present the evolution of the family policy (D� 
Lee, 2018), its development and challenges (Chin et al�, 2012), comparing the 
family policy expansion with other countries such as Japan (Fleckenstein & S�Ch� 
Lee, 2017) and focusing on the issue how family policies can reconcile fertility 
and women’s employment (S� Lee, Duvander, & Zarit, 2016)�
The family policy in South Korea was analysed by D� Lee (2018), who presented 
the trajectory of the family policy development in South Korea from the 1940s 
to the present� The author analysed the background of the policy instruments, 
the policy instruments and the policy goals� She differentiated three periods of 
development of the family policy in Korea� The first period was from 1945 to 
1988 – it was an era of embryonic Korean family policy when family intervention 
was limited and indirect, based on Confucian familism� During the second period, 
from 1988 to 2003, explicit family policies emerged, but the Korean government 
kept family intervention to a minimum – it maintained a division of roles between 
the state, the market and families (the state as the regulator and the market/fami-
lies as the providers), and maintained patriarchal family relations and gendered 
family roles based on Confucian familism� The third period, from 2003 to 2016, 
showed an explosive expansion of family policies and changes in policy goals and 
regimes based on neo-familism, which emphasizes democratic and equal gender 
relations within families and a family-friendly, supportive society�
Writing about contemporary family policy, it is important to mention what 
contributed to the drastic fall in Korean fertility after 1960� In the 1960s, the 
total fertility rate in South Korea was around 6�0 (D�S� Kim, 2005), therefore the 
policymakers decided to introduce the anti-natalist policy in 1962 (Population 
Growth Control Policy 1962–1970), which aimed to reduce the average number 
of children the Koreans had, exerted a huge influence on the decrease in the 
number of births� Since then, the idea of a marriage with one or two children 
has become very popular, which made the total fertility rate drop below the 
replacement level (2�1) in 1983 and continue declining� The start of the efforts to 
increase the number of births in Korea took place in 1996, when the government 
abolished the fertility control policies and adopted a New Population Policy 
(Cho, 2006, p� 3; S�S� Lee, 2009)� The designed and implemented family policy 
was an intervention of the consequences of the anti-natalist policy of 1962� The 
main goal of the family policy was to increase the birth rate�
In 2004, the government established the Presidential Committee on Aging 
and Future Society, which provided the government’s support for free deliv-
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ery, incentives to encourage births, and tax favours for nursing and education 
expenses as parts of the birth encouragement policy� In addition, the government 
enacted the Basic Act for Low Fertility and Ageing Society in 2005 to establish 
the systematic foundation for low fertility (S�S� Lee, 2009, p� 63)�
In the period of 2006–2010, the government established the “Saero Maji” 
plan, i�e�, Short-Term Plan and the First Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Aged 
Society (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2015)� In the following years, from 2011 
to 2015, the Second Plan for Low Fertility and Aged Society (Ministry of Health 
and Welfare, 2015) and from 2016 to 2020 – the Third Plan for Low Fertility and 
Aged Society were implemented� Each of the introduced pro-natalist policies 
was adapted to the conditions as well as the existing social and demographic 
problems (S�S� Lee, 2009, p� 63)�
Korea’s contemporary family policy includes gender equality policies� They 
are designed in many ways with a strong emphasis on work-life balance policies 
for sustainable economic growth and also aspects on gender equality� They high-
light issues related to supporting the father’s greater involvement in childcare, 
facilitating women’s entry into the labour market, increasing available jobs for 
women, and supporting women in pursuing a career�
When analysing the contemporary family policy and gender equality, it can 
be seen that these policies are very well designed because of the spheres of life in 
which the most problems exist (especially for the female gender)� These policies 
focus on compatibility of work and family and creating opportunities for parents 
to spend more time with their children and family� They provide childcare service 
and support for multicultural families� They also focus on maternity, child, infant 
and pre-schoolers services� They also aim at reducing the gender gap and work-
life balance and focus on the utilisation of women’s resources (cf� Ministry of 
Gender Equity and Family; Ministry of Health and Welfare)�
The part of the family policy are also maternity, paternity and parental leaves 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2015)� Maternity leave is 90 calendar days – 
a minimum of 45 days must be taken after birth� It provides 100% of ordinary 
earnings at the time of taking leave paid by the employer for the first 60 days, 
and 100% of ordinary earnings paid by the Employment Insurance Fund for 
the last 30 days (H� Kim, 2017a, p� 1)� In 2020, the upper limit on the maternity 
benefit for the last 30 days increased from 1�800�000 KRW (about 1�300 EURO) 
to 2�000�000 KRW (about 1�400 EURO)� This means that the total maternity leave 
benefit paid for 90 days by Employment Insurance Fund increased to 6�000�000 
KRW (about 4�450 EURO)�
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Paternity leave in Korea is becoming more and more popular – till September 
2019 it was a period of three to five days� It provided 100% of ordinary earnings 
for the first three days paid by the employer� The remaining two days were unpaid 
(H� Kim, 2017b, p� 253)� From October 2019, the duration of the paternity leave 
was extended from three to five days up to ten days, paid by the employer� The 
Employment Insurance Fund pays for five days of leave up to the monthly limit 
of KRW 2�000�000 (about 1�400 EURO) (H� Kim & Shin, 2021, p� 370)�
The Ministry of Employment and Labour offers the longest 52-week paid 
parental and home care leave reserved for fathers as compared to the OECD 
countries (OECD, 2017)� According to the statistics (Statista, 2018), in 2008, only 
355 fathers took such a long leave� In turn, in 2017, over 12,000 fathers took 
paid parental and home care leave (Statista, 2018)� There is an upward trend in 
the number of men using paid parental and home care leave, and thus there is 
a downward trend among women�
Parental leave is a period of one year for each employed parent� Both parents 
can take leave at the same time, subject to the agreement of both employers� If 
both parents take leave at the same time, only one parent receives the parental 
leave benefit of 40% of ordinary earnings� This rises to 60% of ordinary earnings 
for parents taking part-time parental leave� In cases where both parents take 
parental leave for the same child at different times, the allowance for the first 
three months of leave taken by the second parent increases to 100% of ordinary 
earnings (H� Kim, 2017a, pp� 1–2)�
Another government activity was the Best Family-Friendly Management pro-
gramme, in which the government certifies the most family-friendly companies 
that promote a good work-life balance among their employees, including proper 
implementation of leave entitlements and flexible workplace arrangements (H�J� 
Kim, 2015)� This solution should ensure that working fathers and mothers can 
spend more time with their families�
The government has also launched two campaigns – Family Day and Father’s 
Month – to better facilitate the adoption of family-friendly management� Every 
Wednesday is a Family Day in order to encourage the overworked Koreans to 
finish work on time at least one day a week so that they can spend time with their 
families� In addition, every last Wednesday is now the Culture Day� In that day 
families can get discounts and free admissions to theatres, shows and exhibitions 
(H�J� Kim, 2015)�
Yet another action that the government has introduced is the customised 
child care in day care centres, in which full-time moms can leave their children 
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for free from 9 a�m� to 3 p�m�, and children of working moms from 7 a�m� to 
7 p�m� (Poon, 2018)� In Korea, the work culture dominates, professional work 
takes up most of the time thus taking away the time devoted to the family� This 
solution should ensure that working fathers and mothers can spend more time 
with their families�
The Ministry of Health and Welfare introduced a new regulation of the 
financial support to pregnant and child raising women as part of the family 
policy, which did not exist several years ago� The financial support is provided 
as vouchers for children at different age groups without having to comply with 
income conditions� The monthly childcare service voucher differs according to 
the age category of the child: from 0 to 1 year of age – 825�000 KRW (about 600 
EURO), from 1 to 2 years of age – 569�000 KRW (about 400 EURO), from 2 to 
3 years of age – 438�000 KRW (about 300 EURO), and from 3 to 5 years of age – 
220�000 KRW (about 160 EURO)� There are also medical allowances to mothers 
and their new born children for healthcare bills related to maternity� Pregnant 
women are able to get e-vouchers of 500�000 KRW (about 400 EURO) that can 
be used to pay medical bills related to pregnancy� There also exists a monthly 
childcare service voucher to reduce the financial burden associated with parent-
hood, and maintain a desirable work-life balance� Additionally, families with 
children aged 0–5, excluding the wealthiest 10%, will be eligible for a child benefit 
of 100�000 KRW (about 70 EURO) per month (from September 2018) (Ministry 
of Health and Welfare)�
The latest information indicates that under the new policy, the government 
will provide 300�000 KRW (about 220 EURO) as a bonus every month to all 
infants in the first year after their birth starting from 2022, while the monthly 
cash allowance will have gradually expanded to 500�000 KRW (about 370 
EURO) by 2025� The new incentives and cash bonuses are separate from the 
government’s earlier monthly allowance of 100�000 KRW (about 70 EURO) for 
each child under the age of 5� Also, the government will dole out a 2 million 
won (about 1,500 EURO) cash bonus to expectant parents to help cover their 
prenatal expenses starting from 2022� The government also plans to increase 
the current 600�000 KRW (about 450 EURO) congratulatory allowance for each 
pregnant woman to 1 million won (about 750 EURO), while also including extra 
perks for working parents� Under the new package, couples with a child less 
than 12 months old can each receive up to 3 million won (about 2,200 EURO) 
in a monthly salary when both take a 3-month leave from work� Due to the high 
education expenses, the government will also provide university tuition fees to 
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families in the low-income bracket with more than three children (Ministry of 
Health and Welfare)�
In general, in Korea, tradition defines a man as the head of a family who 
must meet the economic needs of the family members� To meet tradition and 
stereotypical thinking, the government is trying to change the image of a man� 
Actions are taken to make the image of a man become popular not only as the 
head of the family but also as an active father who participates in the family 
life – takes care of children and takes part in their upbringing�
ANALYSIS PART 1 –  
ANALYSIS OF SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS
This part of the analysis will present sociodemographic and economic indicators 
that directly or indirectly affect fertility, the analysis of which will provide a close 
assessment of how effective the actions taken by the Korean government are in 
order to cause fertility growth�
South Korea is a country where 98% of children are born in a marriage union� 
Births of children outside marriage are rare – only 2% of children are born this 
way� Since 1995, the proportion of extramarital births has not changed signifi-
cantly (OECD, 2017)� Since the introduction of the anti-natalist policy in South 
Korea in 1962 aimed at reducing fertility, which at the time was high with the 
total fertility rate of 6�0 (D�S� Kim, 2005), there has been a rapid and systematic 
decrease in the number of births of children up to the 1990s� In later years, this 
decrease was milder (see Graphs 1 and 2)�
The decrease in the number of married couples is directly linked to low 
fertility� Since 1980, there has been a steady decline with minor fluctuations� In 
1980, the crude marriage rate was 10�6‰ and in 2020 it was 4�2‰ (see Graph 3)�
The average age of women and men getting married also increased – in 2020, 
for women it was around 31 years of age, and for men around 33 years of age (see 
Graph 4)� The increased average age for getting married has an effect on the age 
people become parents� In 2019, most children were born in age groups between 
30 and 34 and between 35 and 39 (Statistics Korea, 2020b)�
Indirectly, fertility is also affected by women’s professional activity, which 
shows an upward trend (although slowly)� In 2000, the labour force participation 
of women was 48�8%� In 2020, it increased to 52�8%� However, there is still a very 
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large gap between professionally active women and men – in 2020, the share of 
men in the labour market increased by 20% and was 72�6% (Statistics Korea, 2021)�
The statistics that affect the assessment of how effective the Korean govern-
ment has been also refer to the use of parental, maternity and paternity leave� In 
2019, the number of employees taking maternity leave was 73,306 – it applies to 
24% of the total number of births (H� Kim & Shin, 2021, p� 371)� The percentage 
of women taking maternity leave is low�
There are three main reasons why taking maternity leave is not so frequent� 
The first reason is low female employment rates, as many women giving birth are 
not employed� The second reason is that the coverage of employment insurance 
Graph 1. Total Fertility 
Rate from  
1900 to 2020
Source: Statista� Retrieved 
from: www�statista�com
Grap 2. Number of 
Births from  
2000 to 2020
Source: Statista� Retrieved 
from: www�statista�com
99Katarzyna Juszczyk-Frelkiewicz : Contemporary Family Policy in South Korea 
Graph 4. Median Age 
at First Marriage from 





Graph 3. Number of Marriages and Crude Marriage Rate from 1970 to 2020
Source: Statistics Korea� Retrieved from: www�kostat�go�kr�
is limited1, and the third reason is that self-employed workers are not eligible to 
maternity leave (H� Kim & Shin, 2021, p� 371)�
In 2019, 63�6% of mothers took parental leave in contrast to only 1�8% of 
fathers� While the share of fathers taking parental leave has increased ninefold 
compared to 2010, still mainly mothers take parental leave� The number of 
1 Employment Insurance (EI) does not cover government officials, teachers (both in public and 
private schools), part-time workers working fewer than 60 hours per month, or domestic workers� 
EI also does not cover businesses in the agriculture, forestry, fishery, and hunting sectors with four 
or fewer employees, nor does it cover small construction firms�
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parents taking parental leave has been increasing steadily in recent years� Also 
noteworthy here is the increase in fathers who have taken parental leave more 
and more often (L� Yoon, 2021)�
Almost 23,000 men in the corporate sector took paternity leave in 2019, 
which is an increase by 26�2% compared to 2018� This was the first time that the 
male tally has topped 20,000 (Y�J� Kim & H�J� Kim, 2020)� Despite the increase, 
the number of fathers taking paternity leave is still very low�
The analysis of the above indicators shows that fertility in South Korea 
is still low� Since 1960, the number of children has been steadily decreasing� 
The introduction of the family policy to support families with children has 
only caused small upward fluctuations (see Graphs 1 and 2)� The analysis of 
the contemporary family policy shows that the Korean government keeps 
introducing new legal regulations, financial support and services to support 
families with children� However, these actions seem to be insufficient for the 
contemporary Korean men and women, because the fertility rate has been 
very low for a long time� The new legal regulations and financial support itself 
appear to be insufficient in a society in which awareness, the roles of women 
and men and the social hierarchy have been inspired by the Confucian phi-
losophy for centuries� Changing the awareness of the Korean society towards 
gender equality in every sphere of life – family, professional and social one – is 
a difficult challenge which can take decades to meet� It should be pointed out 
that the gender equality policy was introduced in Korea 20 years ago and it is 
constantly developing, new legislation is being enacted, and yet South Korea 
still has the highest gender inequality among OECD countries� According to 
the analysis of this part of the data, the current family policy is not effective, 
as it does not increase fertility�
ANALYSIS PART 2 – THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA  
FROM THE KOREAN LONGITUDINAL SURVEY OF WOMEN  
AND FAMILIES
The changes in the number of children the Korean women have or intend to 
have are important indicators that show fertility trends in South Korea� On their 
basis, we can also assess how effective the government efforts to increase fert 
ility in South Korea are� This part of the article presents a statistical analysis of 
the number of children the respondents have, the number of children living 
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together with the respondents, and the fertility intentions in the comparative 
perspective – in the first wave (2007) and in the seventh wave (2018)�
In 2007, all the respondents had children, with the highest percentage being 
women with two children (54�4%)� Almost 22% of children did not live together 
with the respondents� In 2018, nearly 19% of women did not have children, 
and the percentage of women with two children decreased by more than 10 
percentage points and was 43�9%� The percentage of children not living together 
increased to almost 43%, which indicates that the percentage doubled between 
2007 and 2018� Over the years, there have been changes in the fertility of the 
respondents� These changes show that the number of children that women have 
is decreasing and that 20% of them do not have children at all (Table 1)�
Table 1. Number of Children and Number of Children Living Together in 2007 
and 2018
Number of children
1st Wave 2007 7th Wave 2018
N % N %
no children 0.0 0.0 1703 18.5
one child 1427 17.0 1221 13.2
two children 4557 54.4 4055 43.9
three children 1673 20.0 1613 17.5
four children 501 6.0 439 4.8
five and more 226 2.6 198 2.1
Total 8384 100.0 9229 100.0
Number of children living together
1st Wave 2007 7th Wave 2018
N % N %
no children 1804 21.5 3941 42.7
one child 2288 27.3 1854 20.1
two children 3537 42.2 2737 29.6
three and more children 748 9.0 701 7.6
Total 8377 100.0 9233 100.0
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the data from the Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women 
and Families 2007 and 2018�
The age group is an independent variable that in statistical terms significantly 
affects the number of children who live together in both periods covered by the 
survey (2007: X2 = 381�583; p < 0�001; 2018: X2 = 1845�788; p < 0�000)� While 
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the Cramér’s V coefficient defines the result from 2007 at the level of a weak 
relationship (V = 0�164), in 2018 the level was moderate (V = 0�439) (Table 2)�
In 2007 (Wave 1), the respondents most frequently had two children (59�7%) 
and one in four of the respondents had one child (24�2%)� Approximately 13% of 
women had 3 or more children� The lowest percentage applied to the respondents 
who did not have children living together� In most cases, women of lower age 
groups had one child, while women of higher age groups had two children, which 
is a natural phenomenon (Table 2)�
In 2018 (Wave 7), the number of women without children living together 
increased from 3�1% in 2007 to 39�6%� The percentage of women with one child 
decreased by 10 percentage points (13�0%) and by nearly 20 percentage points 
in the case of women with two children (36�2%) living together� Women in age 
groups from 34 to 38 and from 39 to 45 most often had two children (42�6% and 
57�8%, respectively) (Table 2)�
The analysis shows that the fertility trends among the respondents changed in 
the analysed time horizon between 2007 and 2018� They indicate a shift towards 
having fewer children regardless of the respondents’ age groups�
The next part of the statistical analysis refers to a question in the Korean 
Longitudinal Survey of Women and Families about the fertility intentions among 
the Korean women – do they plan to have a child or not? The respondents had 
three options to choose from: yes, no, and I don’t know�
The statistical analysis of the data included in the first wave of surveys carried 
out in 2007 shows that the independent variable, which is the respondents’ age 
category, affects the fertility intentions among the Korean women significantly 
in statistical terms (X2 = 592�227; p < 0�001), while the Cramér’s V coefficient 
defines them at the level of a weak relationship (V = 0�265)� A vast majority of the 
respondents did not plan to have children (82�9%)� Only 12�1% of the surveyed 
Korean women wanted to become mothers, while 5�0% were not decided yet� 
In the group of the respondents planning to have children the greatest percent-
age was Korean women in the 30–39 age group (7�6%) (see Table 3)� The lack 
of fertility intentions may result from the fact that in Wave 1 all the surveyed 
women already had children (see Table 1)�
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no children one child two children three and more children Total
19–23
N 1 15 6 0 22
% 4.5 68.2 27.3 0.0 100.0
24–28
N 6 158 115 12 291
% 2.1 54.3 39.5 4.1 100.0
29–33
N 15 359 565 83 1022
% 1.5 35.1 55.3 8.1 100.0
34–38
N 24 274 1042 240 1580
% 1.5 17.3 65.9 15.2 100.0
39–45
N 102 335 1086 277 1800
% 5.7 18.6 60.3 15.4 100.0
Total
N 148 148 1141 2814 1415







no children one child two children three and more children Total
19–23 N 315 1 0 0 316
% 99.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 100.0
24–28 N 441 10 10 1 462
% 95.5 2.2 2.2 0.2 100.0
29–33 N 227 72 70 14 383
% 59.3 18.8 18.3 3.7 100.0
34–38 N 148 127 239 74 588
% 25.2 21.6 40.6 12.6 100.0
39–45 N 135 205 837 271 1448
% 9.3 14.2 57.8 18.7 100.0
Total
N 1266 415 1156 360 3197
% 39.6 13.0 36.2 11.3 100.0
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the data from the Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women 
and Families 2007 and 2018�
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The statistical analysis of the data coming from the seventh wave of surveys 
carried out in 2018 also shows that the independent variable being the age cat-
egory of the respondents affects the fertility intentions among the Korean women 
significantly in statistical terms (X2 = 198�016; p < 0�001), while the Cramér’s 
V coefficient defines them at the level of a weak relationship (V = 0�224)� The 
percentage of women who plan to become mothers remained at the comparable 
level of about 4% – in this group the most women with procreative plans was 
in the 30–39 age group� The percentage of undecided women increased slightly 
from 5�0% to 6�2% (see Table 3)�
Table 3. Fertility Intentions by Korean Women
1st Wave (2007)
Age group
Plan to have a baby or not
Yes No I don’t know Total
19–29
N 184 202 49 435
% 4.4% 4.8% 1.2% 10.3%
30–39
N 320 2307 149 2776
% 7.6% 54.6% 3.5% 65.7%
40–45
N 9 991 13 1013
% 0.2% 23.5% 0.3% 24.0%
Total
N 513 3500 211 4224
% 12.1% 82.9% 5.0% 100.0%
7th Wave (2018)
Age group
Plan to have a baby or not
Yes No I don’t know Total
19–29 N 8 19 8 35
% 0.4% 1.0% 0.4% 1.8%
30–39 N 72 613 86 771
% 3.7% 31.2% 4.4% 39.2%
40–45
N 8 1125 28 1161
% 0.4% 57.2% 1.4% 59.0%
Total
N 88 1757 122 1967
% 4.5% 89.3% 6.2% 100.0%
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the data from the Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women 
and Families 2007 and 2018�
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The statistical analysis of the longitudinal surveys shows an alarming 
phenomenon of no fertility intentions� The independent variable being the 
age category of the respondents affects the fertility intentions among women 
significantly in statistical terms in two waves of the Korean Longitudinal Survey 
of Women and Families�
The analysis shows differences in the fertility intentions among the respond-
ents when comparing 2007 to 2018� A large percentage of the respondents did not 
plan to have children in 2007, as the respondents already had them� The situation 
was different in 2018, where a large proportion of women who had children and 
those who did not have children did not plan to become mothers again or for 
the first time, respectively� When analysing the results in the perspective of how 
effective the contemporary family policy was, it should be concluded that the 
proposed and implemented family policy did not affect the fertility intentions of 
the female respondents from KLoWF until 2018� Moreover, it has been observed 
that an increasing percentage of the female respondents do not intend to have 
the first or the next child�
CONCLUSION
Ageing society is a huge social problem and a challenge for the Korean govern-
ment to create a family policy that will contribute to the natural increase� The 
number of children has fallen so drastically that it has become a social problem, 
leading to numerous governmental debates and discussions on drafting policies 
to support families in order to encourage them to have children, and to introduce 
new legal regulations and services to support the family life�
The Korean government started to establish explicit family policies in the 
mid-2000s� These policies mean a symbolic focus shift to family matters in the 
history of the social policy in South Korea (Chin et al�, 2012)�
When analysing the actions undertaken by the Korean government, it may 
be concluded that the government tries to face the social and demographic 
transformations that are typical of society 5�0, by undertaking actions aimed at 
supporting families in various spheres of its functioning�
The long-term effect of financial support may contribute to increased fertility 
rate among the Korean families due to the current financial support from the 
government� However, more time is needed to obtain effective results, as the 
gender imbalance and gender stereotypes based on the Confucian values which 
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are observed in South Korea also play a major role and have the influence on low 
fertility� Being aware of the problem and also with regard to the low birth rate 
and aging society, the South Korean government is recently trying to get more 
men to take parental leave�
However, the demographic data keep indicating a low fertility rate, and the 
statistical analysis of the data from the Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women 
and Families clearly shows that the surveyed Korean women did not have fertility 
intentions, which is an alarming predicator for the low fertility rate being main-
tained in South Korea� The answer given to the question in the article shows that 
the family policy pursued by the Korean government is not currently effective, 
as the fertility rate remains low all the time�
Many scholars pointed out that support for women (wives) from husbands 
and/or grandparents in childcare greatly affects their decision to have the sec-
ond child (or the first child) rather than the benefits offered in institutional 
policies (S�Y� Yoon, 2017)� Therefore, not only creating a family-friendly policy is 
important for increasing the number of births but above all the change of social 
stereotypes about gender�
Generally speaking, creating a family policy in South Korea is extremely dif-
ficult, primarily due to the values in the Korean society, rooted in the Confucian 
philosophy and male-dominated corporate culture (Tan, 2008)� These values 
refer to the role of men and women in the family and in the workplace� A woman 
should raise children, take care of her husband and the house� In turn, the man 
should secure the family economically� These values  also apply to the great 
emphasis placed on education, especially for the male sex� On the other hand, 
male-dominated corporate culture makes it difficult for women to participate in 
the labour market on an equal footing by receiving less salaries than men in the 
same positions, and the possibility of promotion to high positions is also limited�
Due to the above reasons, in the times of contemporary changes in the values 
of Koreans, who are currently oriented towards professional development and 
education, creating a family policy is a challenge for the state�
We can conclude that the Korean family policy are not sufficient to create 
a supportive environment for the family in fertility intentions and behaviour, 
which is reflected in the continued low fertility rate� As Soo-Yeon Yoon argues, 
many Koreans are not even aware of the rights and benefits supporting parenting 
(2017, pp� 227–254)� Therefore action should be taken to increase the society’s 
awareness regarding the information on the benefits supporting parenting�
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In order to increase the number of births, the Korean government should 
promote a greater degree of male domestic duties, a greater commitment to 
taking care and bringing up children in a more prominent way� Relieving 
a woman of part of her duties resulting from the motherhood and home care 
could contribute to a decision to have another child�
The cultural change will take time, but in the case of achieving the aim of 
increasing fertility there is also a need for the additional labour market, educa-
tion and social policy reform to help the Koreans achieve both work and family 
balance, and contribute to the rejuvenation of the Korean society� Thus, there is 
a need for continued research and policy response�
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